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| PHÎÒÎ: AP |
Nhe U.S. plans to further strengthen its political and military presence in Central Asia. Obviously, the reload in the relations with Russia will not be an obstacle to such plans. Last week, the U.S. administration announced plans to set up a new powerful military base on the territory of Afghanistan just 50 kilometers from the border of Uzbekistan
The base is being set up for the specific purpose of supporting all military operations in the region, the recently appointed Commander of International Forces for U.S. International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan General David Petreus pointed out. Projects of lower priority will also be implemented in Central Asia. For example, the U.S. military plan to set up border checkpoints in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. In any case, this initiative raises the hairs of Kremlin officials, who long ago set as their main objective forcing the U.S. military contingent out of Central Asia.
Just a couple of years ago it seemed that relations between the U.S. and Uzbekistan were hopelessly corrupted. Washington harshly responded to the mass shooting of an opposition demonstration in Andijan in 2005 and pushed the seemingly irreplaceable Uzbek leader into the arms of Moscow. But the Eastern rulers always avoided unilateral dependence.
This is precisely why as soon as the new U.S. Administration under President Barack Obama, realizing the vulnerability of its position in Afghanistan without the support of Central Asian republics, began seeking ways of reconciliation with Tashkent, Karimov willingly agreed to rapprochement.
At the beginning of 2010, the president of Uzbekistan approved a plan of action to strengthen cooperation with the U.S. The plan was drafted in the first round of the Uzbek-U.S. consultations held in Washington on December 17-18 last year and addresses the issues of politics, economics and security, as well as a guarantee of peace and stability in Afghanistan.
In the economic sphere, there are plans to hold consultations on rescinding the Jackson-Vanik amendment regarding Uzbekistan. In addition, the U.S. must attend to domestic procedures in order for the Agreement on Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Foreign Investments signed in December 1994 to take effect. The U.S. plans to help Uzbekistan modernize its irrigation systems, improve the reclamation and restoration of degraded lands and attract new technologies to increase crop yields.
Military officers of Uzbekistan are invited for retraining in the leading military and educational institutions of the U.S. in the framework of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. The two countries will cooperate in the spheres of border security, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, anti-terrorism measures and programs within the framework of the Foreign Military Financing and Excess Defense Articles program, which entails the injection of billions in financial terms.
In the framework of cooperation in ensuring peace and stability in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and the U.S. will share information about threats and measures to prevent the transit of non-military goods through the distribution network in northern Afghanistan within the framework of the Hairaton-Mazarin Sharif railway project.
All of these large-scale plans testify to the fact that the tension in relations between the U.S. and Uzbekistan are a thing of the past. Although the U.S. administration continues to criticize the situation with democracy and human rights in the Central Asian republic, matters will hardly go further than words. For the current administration success in Afghanistan is too important to make it dependent on the democratization agenda. Meanwhile, Tashkent plays a critical role in regulating the situation in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan is not just an important link in guaranteeing the supply of rations to NATO troops seeing as the northern part of Afghanistan is populated by ethnic Uzbeks, who are natural allies of the U.S. in the fight against the Pashtun ethnic composition of the Taliban.
Realizing that its attempt to create a sustainable pro-Western central government in Afghanistan is none other than an exercise in futility, the U.S. is more inclined to plan the "tribalization" of the country, which means handing over power to ethnic groups and influential tribal alliances that will withstand the radical centralization of the religious and political agenda of the Taliban. Naturally, the Uzbeks in this regard do not play the last role. A strong base in the area where the ethnic group lives will be an important stronghold for the U.S. in a relatively amicable environment and a lever of influence on neighboring Uzbekistan.
Ethnic Uzbeks have become a key geopolitical factor in Kyrgyzstan. Russia was unable to force the closure of the U.S. base in Manas, so it tried to expand its military presence in the country by opening an additional base in the region of Osh. However, this plan failed because the current authorities of the country cannot control the situation in the south-western part of Kyrgyzstan, which is populated mainly by Uzbeks.
Given this, Uzbekistan has become a key factor in the “base” diplomacy of the U.S. and Russia. At the same time, noteworthy is the fact that Karimov feels more self-assured in Uzbekistan than Bakiyev did in Kyrgyzstan, though he did not dare to open a new U.S. base on its territory.
So, despite that Karimov’s partnering with the U.S. in the military-technical sphere makes the Kremlin nervous, the leadership in Moscow will most likely abstain from the Kyrgyzstan scenario.
This means that Tashkent will have to continue sitting on the fence between Washington and Moscow.
One way or another, the third powerful player in this geopolitical game is China and it is precisely the prospect of rivalry on the part of Beijing and Moscow in the region that stipulates the need for the U.S. to strengthen its presence in Central Asia. For the very same reason, the U.S. will try to preserve their bases even after operations in Afghanistan are complete.
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